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Beyond Wainwright v. Sykes: Expanding the Role of
the Cause-and-Prejudice Test in Federal Habeas
Corpus Actions
We think of habeas corpus as an important safeguard of liberty. To
ChiefJustice Chase it was "the best and ony sufticient defence ofpersonal
freedom. " To ChiefJustice Warren it was "both the symbol and the guard-
ian of individual liberty. "
In recent years, the number of federal habeas corpus 2 petitions
1 Wright, Habeas Corpus.- Its Histoy and Its Future, 81 MICH. L. REV. 802, 803
(1983) (quoting Expare Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54, 58 (1968)).
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper wrote:
The most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation between the fed-
eral courts and the states is federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. Commentators
are critical of its present scope, federal judges are unhappy at the burden of
thousands of mostly frivolous petitions, state courts resent having their decisions
reexamined by a single federal district judge, and the Supreme Court in recent
terms has shown a strong inclination to limit its availability. Meanwhile, prisoners
thrive on it as a form of occupational therapy and for a few it serves as a means of
redressing constitutional violations.
17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION 558 (1978)(footnote omitted).
2 "Habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a proceeding, usually criminal, which results
in some type of confinement. It is not a substitute for an appeal; rather it is a civil remedy for
testing the legality of the petitioner's detention." Comment, The Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus
Relief for State Prisoners, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 417 (1978).
For a general discussion of federal habeas corpus, see R. SOKOL, A HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL HABEAS CORPUS (1965); Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 337 (1983). For a general discussion of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, see
Symposium, State Prisoner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 269 (1983);
Comment, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 71 GEO. L.J. 759 (1982).
Habeas corpus for state prisoners is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
§ 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts (a) The Supreme Court, a Justice
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States. (b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State correc-
tive process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner. (c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented. (d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal
court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant
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has increased dramatically. The number of prisoners challenging
state convictions through federal habeas corpus petitions rose nearly
700 percent from 1961 through 1982,3 although only a small number
of inmates obtained release.4 The United States Supreme Court has
to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to
which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were
parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and ade-
quate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall
establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit- (1) that the
merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing; (2) that
the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at
the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding; (5) that
the applicant was an indigent and the State Court, in deprivation of his constitu-
tional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceed-
ing; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process
of law in the State court proceeding; (8) or unless that part of the record of the
State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made,
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such fac-
tual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court
on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7),
inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respon-
dent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph num-
bered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does
not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the appli-
cant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State
court was erroneous. (e) If the applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced in such State court proceeding to support the State court's determination
of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, if able, shall produce that part of the
record pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such determination. If the applicant, because of indigency or other reason is unable
to produce such part of the record, then the State shall produce such part of the
record and the Federal court shall direct the State to do so by order directed to an
appropriate State official. If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of the
record, then the court shall determine under the existing facts and circumstances
what weight shall be given to the State court's factual determination. () A copy of
the official records of the State court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to be a
true and correct copy of a finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia
showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the
Federal court proceeding.
3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Advance Release to SPECIAL REPORT NCJ 92948, HABEAS
CORPUS--FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PRISONER PETITION, at 2.
4 An examination of the habeas corpus petitions filed in six federal courts and one court
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responded to this explosion of habeas corpus litigation by limiting
state prisoners' access to federal habeas review.
In 1977 the Supreme Court held, in Wainwrzght v. Sykes, 5 that a
state prisoner who fails to lodge a timely objection under a state con-
temporaneous objection rule is barred from federal habeas review of
his constitutional claim unless he can show cause for his noncompli-
ance and actual prejudice from the alleged violation (the "cause-and-
prejudice" test). 6 Typically, contemporaneous objection rules re-
quire a defendant to raise certain objections at trial; if defendant's
counsel does not object at the appropriate time, the objection is
waived. The contemporaneous objection rule on which the court re-
lied in Wainwright required that a motion to suppress an illegally-
obtained confession or admission be made "prior to trial unless op-
portunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the
grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain
the motion or an appropriate objection at trial."' 7 The courts have
extended this "cause-and-prejudice" test to apply not only to de-
faults under state contemporaneous objection rules, but to all state
procedural defaults."
Immediately after Wainwrzght, the law appeared to be settled-
if the state denied the claim on the merits, the petitioner was auto-
matically entitled to federal habeas review of his constitutional
claim;9 if, on the other hand, the state denied the claim on proce-
dural grounds, the petitioner was barred from federal habeas review
absent a showing of cause and prejudice. 10 Since Wainwrzht, how-
ever, the courts of appeals have heard cases in which the states' deni-
als of petitioners' claims were based alternatively on procedural
grounds and the merits of petitioners' claims. In each of these cases,
the state court noted that a procedural default precluded review of
the petitioner's claim; the court nevertheless addressed and denied
the claim on its merits. Wainwright itself gave no clear-cut guidance
as to whether the federal courts ought to apply the "cause-and-
prejudice" test in such a case. Some of the circuits have chosen to
of appeals showed that only 33 of 1,899, or 1.8 percent of the total petitions filed, resulted in
prisoner release. Id. at 1.
5 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
6 Id. at 87.
7 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i)(2).
8 See note 30 infia.
9 See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
10 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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apply the Wainwright test in these circumstances, while others have
declined to do so.
Part I of this note briefly discusses recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on federal habeas review. Part II examines the approaches
adopted by the circuits which have encountered a state decision al-
ternatively based on substantive and procedural grounds. Part III
then analyzes Wainwn'gh v. Sykes and attempts to distill from it a
guiding principle to which the lower federal courts should look in
deciding whether to apply the cause-and-prejudice standard in
habeas cases.
The clear message of Wainwright is that a state prisoner whose
claim was denied at the state level due to a procedural default must
demonstrate cause and prejudice in order to obtain federal habeas
review; the presence of an alternate holding on the merits does not
and should not alter this rule. Ultimately, then, the federal courts
should apply the Watnwr'ght test whenever the state court's proce-
dural holding is dispositive of the petitioner's constitutional claim.
I. Overview of Supreme Court Decisions on Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners
The scope of federal habeas corpus review has greatly expanded
since the Judiciary Act of 1789 first empowered the federal courts to
issue the writ. I Originally, only federal prisoners challenging the ju-
risdiction of the sentencing court could invoke the writ of habeas
corpus.12 After the Civil War, the scope of federal habeas review was
expanded to include state prisoners "in all cases where any person
may be restrained in violation of the Constitution."'13 Although it
had long since ceased to have any practical effect, the rule limiting
habeas review to federal prisoners challenging the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court technically remained in force until 1942, when the
Supreme Court decided Waley v. Johnston.14 In Waley, the Court ac-
knowledged that habeas review is available for claims of "disregard
of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the
only effective means of preserving his rights."'
5
In Brown v. Allen,' 6 the Court held that a federal court consider-
11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81-82.
12 Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830).
13 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(1976)).
14 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
15 Id. at 104-05.
16 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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ing a habeas petition could relitigate any constitutional claim, even if
it had been considered fairly in the state courts.17 However, the
Brown Court also held that "where the state action was based on an
adequate state ground, no further examination is required, unless no
state remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights ever
existed." 18 Thus, Brown stood for the proposition that an independ-
ent and adequate state ground could preclude federal habeas review.
Ten years later, the Court decided Fay v. Noia.I9 The petitioner
in Fay had decided not to appeal his murder conviction, fearing that
if he were successful he might face retrial and a possible death sen-
tence. The Supreme Court upheld the power of a federal court to
grant habeas corpus relief, notwithstanding the petitioner's decision
not to avail himself of direct appeal. The Court determined that a
state prisoner had a right to federal habeas review of his federal con-
stitutional claim unless he deliberately by-passed presenting that
claim on the state level.20
InFay, the Court overruled Brown-' holding on independent and
adequate state procedural grounds, holding that the adequate state
ground principle is a function of the limitations of appellate review
and does not apply in habeas corpus proceedings. The Court stated
that "the doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to
constitute an adequate and independent state law ground barring
direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to limit the power
granted the federal courts under the federal habeas statute. ' 21
In Fay, the Warren Court greatly expanded the scope of federal
collateral review of state procedural defaults. In more recent years,
however, the Burger Court has reversed this trend.2 2 The Burger
17 Id. at 463-64.
18 Id. at 458.
19 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
20 Id. at 438-39. The Court, noting the petitioner's "grisly choice" between accepting his
life sentence and pursuing an appeal which might result in a death sentence, held that peti-
tioner had not deliberately by-passed state procedure.
The kind of deliberate by-passes which the Court contemplated precluding federal
habeas corpus review were "calculated strategic choices to circumvent state procedures."
Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. CHI. L.
REv. 741, 753 (1982).
21 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 399. "In Fay v. Noia . . . the Court abolished the adequate
state procedural ground rule on collateral attack. . . . To the Court, the penalty of forever
losing a meritorious constitutional defense was unnecessarily severe for disobedience of a state
procedural rule." Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 753.
22 See Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 753 ("After expanding enormously under the Warren
Court, federal collateral review of procedural defaults has contracted under the Burger
Court."); Remington, State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal
Courts," An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287 (1983) (The likelihood
[1984]
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Court's first important habeas corpus decision came in 1976 in Stone
v. Powell.2 3 In Stone, the Court held that challenges resting on the
fourth amendment are not cognizable in federal habeas courts where
there has been a full and fair opportunity to raise them in the state
court.2 4 One year later, the Court decided Wainwright v. Sykes.
2 5
During Sykes' trial for murder, the court admitted inculpatory
statements which Sykes had made to police officers. At the time of
trial, Sykes did not challenge this evidence, and he was convicted.
Sykes asserted, in his motion to vacate the conviction and in his state
habeas corpus petitions, that the statements were inadmissible be-
cause he had not understood the warnings which police read to him
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.26 The Florida courts denied Sykes'
motion to vacate and his petition for habeas relief because he had not
complied with Florida's contemporaneous objection rule.
2 7
On review, the United States Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner who fails to lodge a timely objection under a state contem-
poraneous objection rule is barred from federal habeas review of his
constitutional claim, unless he can show cause for noncompliance
with the rule and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional
of a favorable decision for a state habeas petitioner is increasingly remote, particularly be-
cause of the difficulty of meeting the procedural prerequisites for federal habeas corpus review
and, when review is gained, the reluctance of federal courts to reverse the state court convic-
tion on the merits.); Michael, The 'Wew"Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in
Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REv. 233 (1979)(The Burger Court increasingly
relies on state courts to protect individuals' constitutional rights.).
One commentator believes that the Burger Court is shifting the emphasis from the valid-
ity of the conviction to the validity of the petitioner's claim of innocence. See Comment, The
Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus Relief for State Prisoners, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417 (1978). An-
other commentator contends that the Burger Court demonstrates a regrettable lack of con-
cern for the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuiy and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
436 (1980).
23 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
24 Id. at 481-82.
The Stone majority believed that a trial untainted by illegally-seized evidence is not
a personal constitutional right and thus is unrelated to the merits of continued in-
carceration, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police
conduct. In effect, the Stone majority held that a purely deterrent policy, with a
justification extraneous to the merits of the particular case, will be honored on direct
review but not on habeas.
Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 772-73.
25 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
26 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27 Sykes was unsuccessful before the Florida District Court of Appeals, see Sykes v. State,
275 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), and before the Florida Supreme Court, see Sykes v.
State, 274 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973). For a discussion of contemporaneous objection rules, see
text accompanying note 7 supra.
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violation.28 In zainwrzkt, the Burger Court took from state prison-
ers petitioning for federal habeas relief much of what the Warren
Court had given them in Fay. As one commentator noted, Wain-
wright "seemed to revive the pre-Fay deference on habeas to state
procedural grounds."
29
The lower federal courts wasted no time in extending the Wain-
wrht test to defaults under state procedural rules other than con-
temporaneous objection rules.30 In 1982, in Engle v. Isaac, the Court
held that the Wainwright cause-and-prejudice standard applies to any
state procedural default.
31
28 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. The cause-and-prejudice test was first developed
in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), in which a federal prisoner sought to challenge
the makeup of the grand jury which indicted him. The Government contended that he was
barred by FED. R. GRIM. P. 12(b)(2), which requires that such challenges be made by motion
before trial. The Supreme Court held that review of the claim should be barred on habeas
absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual prejudice result-
ing from the alleged constitutional violation. Three years later, in Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976), a state prisoner sought federal habeas review of his challenge to the composi-
tion of the grand jury which indicted him. A state procedural rule required that all such
challenges be made before trial. The Supreme Court applied the Davir cause-and-prejudice
standard and denied habeas review. In Wainwrzght, the Court noted that, "[a]s applied to the
federal petitions of state convicts, the Davis cause-and-prejudice standard was thus incorpo-
rated directly into the body of law governing the availability of federal habeas corpus re-
view." 433 U.S. at 85. The Court then applied the cause-and-prejudice standard in the case
of a Miranda challenge to the admissibility of a confession.
The Wainwright Court chose to leave the definitions of "cause" and "prejudice" for fu-
ture cases:
We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the "cause"-
and-"prejudice" standard, and note here only that it is narrower than the standard
set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia . . . , which would make federal habeas review
generally available to state convicts absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the
federal constitutional contention.
Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
29 Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 754. Another commentator agreed:
Wainwright v. Sykes restored the concept of an adequate state ground in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, but the extent to which a procedural default in the state
courts will preclude a federal habeas corpus consideration of the issue affected will
depend on future interpretations of the concepts of "cause" for the failure to comply
with the state rule and "prejudice" resulting from the alleged constitutional
violation.
Michael, supra note 22, at 267-68.
30 Some of the state procedural defaults to which the federal courts have applied the
Wainwright test are: failure to make an offer of proof, see United States ex rel. Veal v. De-
Robertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982); default under a state rule imposing a time limitation
on filing of petition for post-conviction relief, see United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689
F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982); failure to appeal, see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 903 (7th
Cir. 1982); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004
(1980).
31 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)(A state prisoner whose federal constitutional claim is barred
[ 19841
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Thus, where the state court has denied a petitioner's claim on
procedural grounds, the Wainwright test clearly applies and the peti-
tioner must demonstrate cause and prejudice in order to obtain fed-
eral habeas review. On the other hand, where the state court does
not rely on procedural grounds but, rather, on the merits of a federal
constitutional claim, federal habeas review is available without a
showing of cause and prejudice.
32
Wa'nwn'ght, however, gives no express guidance to federal courts
faced with a habeas claim where the state court had denied the peti-
tioner's claim on alternate procedural and substantive grounds. To
date, the Supreme Court has not heard a case of this type; and the
federal courts of appeals addressing the issue have approached it in
several different ways. After examining these approaches, this note
will focus on Wainwright with a view to discovering which of the ap-
proaches taken by the circuit courts comports with the Supreme
Court's views and policy objectives in habeas review.
II. How the Circuits Have Applied Wainwr'ght v. Sykes to
Alternate Substantive and Procedural Holdings
A. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
1. The Fifth Circuit
The first post-Wainwright case to come before the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit involving both procedural and substantive
holdings at the state level was Ratchj5v. Estelle,33 in 1979. Ratcliff
sought to collaterally challenge the composition of the grand jury
which indicted him. The state appellate court held that Ratcliff's
failure to comply with the state contemporaneous objection rule pre-
cluded consideration of this claim.3 4 The state court also considered
and rejected the claim on the merits. The Fifth Circuit stated:
The difficult part of this case arises because the state habeas
corpus court in its opinion proceeded to discuss the merits of the
constitutional challenge after ruling that there was a procedural
default.
Proper resolution of such a case turns on careful attention to
by a procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice in order to obtain fed-
eral habeas review.).
32 See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); see also Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185
(1 lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 740 (1983); United States exr el Ross v. Franzen, 668
F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1982)(en banc); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981), cerl.
denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
33 597 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
34 Ratcliff v. State, 504 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1974).
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the basis of the state court decision.3 5
The Ratdcif court held that since the state court had applied its
procedural default rule, the federal courts must abide by that deci-
sion absent a showing of cause and prejudice.36 Thus, the Fifth Cir-
cuit applied the Wainwright test where the state court had based its
decision alternatively on the merits of the petitioner's claim and on
procedural grounds.
The Fifth Circuit, however, seems to have taken a different ap-
proach to this problem in Thompson v. Estelle,7 decided just two years
after Ratchft. Thompson claimed that evidence of his prior convic-
tions was improperly admitted at trial. The state court had denied
Thompson's claim both on the merits and on the grounds that he
had failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial as required
by state law. The Fifth Circuit held: "Because the state courts have
not relied exclusivey upon Thompson's procedural default, Wainwright
v. Sykes does not prevent federal habeas review."38
Although this holding is clearly inconsistent with the holding in
Ratcliff the court did not distinguish or even mention Ratc4;9. 39
Since the Fifth Circuit has not heard any more cases of this type, its
current position must be that of its most recent case addressing the
problem-Thompson. The Fifth Circuit view, then, is that the Wain-
wright test applies only if the state court relied exclusively on the
procedural ground.
2. The Ninth Circuit
In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided
Bradford v. Stone.4° The petitioner, Bradford, contested his attempted
robbery and murder convictions, arguing that prosecutorial miscon-
duct had deprived him of a fair trial. The court of appeals held:
The absence of any demonstrated "cause" for this failure to
comply with the California contemporaneous objection rule
might bar review of petitioner's federal constitutional claim in
this proceeding (Wainwr'ght v. Sykes . ..), were it not for the fact
35 Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d at 477.
36 Id. at 476.
37 642 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1981).
38 Id. at 998 (emphasis added).
39 A recent case decided by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, however, addressed the same problem of whether to apply the Wainwright test where
the state court's decision was alternatively based on substantive and procedural grounds. The
district court followed Ratci/ff and applied the Wainwright test despite the presence of a hold-
ing on the merits. Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
40 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
[1984]
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that the state courts did not rely solely upon the procedural de-
fault in ruling on petitioner's direct appeal. . . . Although the
intermediate state court did not pass unequivocally on the merits
of the federal claim, we have chosen to assume the state's fadure to
rest exclusivel upon the procedural default permits us to reach the federal
question 41
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has taken the same view the Fifth Circuit
took in Thompson-that Wainwright applies only if the state court re-
lied exclusively on procedural grounds. If the state court addressed
the merits, Wainwright does not apply.
4 2
3. The Eleventh Circuit
The habeas petitioner in Rogers v. McMullen43 challenged his
murder conviction on the ground that one of the jurors who heard
his case was less than eighteen years old. The state court did not rely
on a procedural default but instead reached the merits of petitioner's
claim.44 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
Wainwright did not apply, citing the holding in Thompson v. Estelle
45
that Wainwright does not prevent federal habeas review where "the
state courts have not relied exclusively upon [the petitioner's] proce-
dural default."'
46
The adoption of the Thompson position was dictum, since the
lack of a state procedural holding would have been sufficient grounds
for not applying Wainwright. Nevertheless, Rogers clearly indicates
that the Eleventh Circuit embraced the Fifth Circuit's position as
expressed in Thompson. The Rogers court stated: "Because the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reached the constitutional issue, we are not fore-
41 Id. at 1296 n.2 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
42 Bradford supports this proposition even more strongly than Thompson, for in Bradford,
the merit holding which rendered Wainwright inapplicable was a tenuous one. The California
District Court of Appeals had denied relief on alternate grounds: that petitioner failed to
object or request a curative instruction; and that the error, if any, was not prejudicial in view
of the evidence against petitioner. Id The California Supreme Court denied review without
comment. Id. The court of appeals noted that "the intermediate state court did not pass
unequivocally on the merits of the federal claim." Id.
43 673 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 740 (1983).
44 State v. Rodgers, 374 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1977).
45 642 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1981). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (1 lth Cir.
1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the
former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on Sept. 30, 1981. Id. at 1209.
This includes Thompson v. Estdl, which held that Wainwright applies only where the state
court relied exclusively on procedural grounds.
46 Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d at 1188 (quoting Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d at
998).
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closed from addressing the merits by Wainwright v. Skes."47 The
implication was that whenever the state court addresses the merits of
the claim, Wainwrgzht would not bar federal habeas review.
The Eleventh Circuit has remained true to this position. In
1983, that court decided .Darden v. Wainwright ,48 in which Darden
claimed that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of due process.
The state court had rejected Darden's claim both on the merits and
on the ground that he had failed to make a timely objection. 49 The
court found that Wainwright did not apply: "It is well settled that
where a state appellate court has adjudicated an issue on its merits,
federal courts may consider it in a petition for habeas corpus ...
Wainwrght v. Sykes is therefore not a bar to our consideration of
Darden's claim."
50
B. The Sixth Circuit
The first case to come before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit involving a habeas claim where a state court denied the claim
on alternate procedural and substantive grounds was Hockenbu?y v.
Sowders.-5 The petitioner, Hockenbury, contended that improper
questions and statements by the state invalidated his robbery convic-
tion. The state court denied Hockenbury's claim both on the merits
and on the ground that he had failed to comply with the state's con-
temporaneous objection rule.
52
The court of appeals in Hockenbugy looked to the rationale be-
hind Wainwright in deciding whether to apply the cause-and-
prejudice analysis:
In view of the rationale of the Wainwr'ht rule,. . it is clear that
the central question is whether the state court denied petitioner's
claim based on an adequate and independent state procedural
ground. In cases such as this where the state court has arguably
given more than one reason for the denial of petitioner's claim,
47 Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d at 1188.
48 699 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on othergrounds, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.
1984).
49 Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1976). The Darden court pointed out in a foot-
note that the state court's discussion of the merits was lengthy, while the procedural holding
which followed it comprised a single paragraph. "We therefore agree with the district court
that the Supreme Court of Florida 'clearly entertained and determined the fair trial issue on
its merits as the primary basis of its decision.' " Id. at 1034 n.4 (quoting Darden v. Wain-
wright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 952 (M.D. Fla. 1981)). Nothing in the opinion suggests, however,
that this finding was necessary to the result reached.
50 Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d at 1034.
51 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981).
52 Hockenbury v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Ky. 1978).
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we hold that the federal court must determine whether the peti-
tioner's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection re-
quirement was a substantial basis of the state court's denial of
petitioner's claim.
53
In 1983, three years after Hockenbuy, the Sixth Circuit, in Hollin v.
Sowders,54 followed the Hockenbuy "substantial basis" standard and
denied habeas review of a claim which alleged that the trial court
had improperly admitted evidence of a prior conviction.
The Sixth Circuit's "substantial basis" standard differs materi-
ally from the view of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Under
the latter analysis, the Wainwright test will never apply where the
state court has decided the merits of the claim. Under the Sixth Cir-
cuit view, however, Wainwright may apply notwithstanding a sub-
stantive holding.
C. The Eighth Circuit
The only case involving state alternate substantive and proce-
dural holdings to come before the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit is Dietz v. Solem .55 In Dietz, the petitioner claimed that erro-
neous jury instructions deprived him of a fair trial. Dietz raised this
issue for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding in which he
applied for federal habeas corpus relief. The Circuit Court for Tur-
ner County, South Dakota, denied the petition, holding that failure
to object to the instruction either at trial or on direct appeal barred
the claim.56 The state court also held that even had Dietz properly
objected to the "intent" instruction, the trial instructions taken as a
whole contained no constitutional violation of due process.
57
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit stated: "We view the last sen-
tence [merit holding] as dicta since the preceding paragraph [proce-
dural holding] disposed of the case and the last statement is based on
a hypothetical assumption. '58 Dietz may suggest that the Eighth Cir-
cuit will construe any merit holding which is preceded by a proce-
53 Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d at 115.
54 710 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1300 (1984).
55 640 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1981).
56 640 F.2d at 131-32 n.1. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed on appeal but
did not address the "intent" instruction issue. State v. Dietz, 264 N.W.2d 509 (S.D. 1978).
The Eighth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether Dietz had satisfied the "cause"
requirement. The district court granted the habeas petition on remand, and the state ap-
pealed. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Dietz had failed to show sufficient cause.
Dietz v. Solem, 677 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1982).
57 Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 131-32 n.1.
58 Id.
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dural holding as dictum, leaving a purely procedural state holding to
which Wainwright applies. If a merit holding on the heels of a proce-
dural holding is dictum, it follows that a procedural holding stated
after a merit holding might also be dictum. In such a case, the peti-
tioner would be entitled to automatic habeas review without the ne-
cessity of showing cause and prejudice, since Wainwright was not
intended to govern cases in which the state court's decision is based
solely on the merits of the petitioner's claim. While this interpreta-
tion of Dietz is logical, it is also speculative. The Eighth Circuit's
position will remain somewhat obscure until that court addresses a
case in which the state court has placed its merit holding before its
procedural holding.
D. The Third, Seventh, and Second Circuits
1. The Third Circuit
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided
United States ex re. Caruso v. Zelinsky. 59 Caruso alleged that his trial
counsel had failed to communicate a plea-bargain offer to him. This
was the first Third Circuit case in which the state court had denied
the petitioner's claim on both substantive and procedural grounds.
The court of appeals evaluated the approaches which the Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits had taken in Thompson, Hlockenbu, and
Dietz and chose to adopt its own standard:
Because we believe that the policies that justify deference to a
valid state procedural rule at all are equally applicable whenever
the state court actually relies on a procedural bar, we conclude that state
court reliance on a procedural rule as an alternate holding suf-
fices to implicate the procedural default doctrine.
60
Thus, the Third Circuit determined that Wainwrigkht applies
whenever the state court relied expressl'y on a procedural ground, re-
gardless of whether that court had considered the merits. The court
of appeals gave several reasons for its decision. Initially, it noted that
an alternate holding carries the same weight as a single holding: it is
binding precedent. 61 Also, the state interests which underlie proce-
dural rules are no less present or valid if the holding on the proce-
dural ground is accompanied by a discussion of the merits of the
case.62
59 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982).





The Caruso court also stated that interests of justice are some-
times better served by denying the prisoner's claim for both proce-
dural and substantive reasons: "Typically, decisions on procedural
grounds are not as satisfying as decisions on the merits, and it is un-
derstandable that a court would want to show that it does not think
its reliance on a procedural rule is causing any great injustice. '63 For
this reason, the Third Circuit believed the federal courts ought not to
adopt a policy which would penalize alternate holdings by state
courts.
Finally, the court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen 64 indicated that, where it is un-
clear whether the state courts have applied the procedural default
rule, the Supreme Court has nevertheless searched for procedural de-
fects. 65 The Third Circuit stated that there is at least as much justifi-
cation for respecting a procedural default ruling when there are
alternate holdings as when there is no clear holding.66
The Third Circuit was the first to carefully analyze the policies
underlying Wainwright in deciding whether the cause-and-prejudice
analysis should be extended to cover alternate state holdings. The
rule which emerged is that Wainwright applies whenever the state
court relied expressly on a procedural ground, regardless of whether
the court considered the merits.
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, like the Third
Circuit, applies the Wainwright cause-and-prejudice test whenever
the state court relied expressly on the procedural ground. In United
States ex rel Veal v. DeRobert's ,67 the court cited Wainwright in its deci-
sion that a state prisoner who claimed that he was denied due process
in his state murder trial was not entitled to federal habeas review
absent a showing of cause and prejudice. The court stated: "[T]his
63 Id.
64 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
65 In Ulster County, the state court had explicitly decided the merits of the federal consti-
tutional claim in denying post-conviction relief. Its opinion was ambiguous, however, and
did not clearly indicate whether a procedural default was involved. The Supreme Court
examined the record and New York law at length in search of the basis of the state court
decision. Although the Court concluded that the state court had decided on the merits, "[i]t
is implicit in the Ulster County decision that the Court would have respected a procedural
default, had it found one, even if the default had not been clear from any state court opin-
ion." United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 440.
66 Id.
67 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982).
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case was decided in part on an independent state procedural ground
to which Sykes and Isaac apply. '68
The court reiterated this view the following year in Farmer v.
Prast.69 In Fanner, the petitioner's disorderly conduct necessitated his
removal from the courtroom during his state trial. Farmer claimed
that he was impermissibly excluded from the courtroom. The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals held that a defendant loses the right to be
present in the courtroom when he conducts himself in a manner so
disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot proceed
with him in the courtroom. 70 The state court also held that Farmer's
default under the Wisconsin contemporaneous objection rule pre-
cluded relief.
71
The Seventh Circuit, in den'ying the habeas corpus petition,
held that:
Federal habeas corpus is precluded when, as here, the state appel-
late court affirms a trial court decision on the twin grounds of
lack of merit in the constitutional claim and of appellant's fail-
ure, without justification, to comply with a state procedural
rule. . . . Invocation of the state procedural rule by the state
appellate court amounts to an "independent and adequate" state
ground barring federal review, absent the "cause and prejudice"
requirements of Wainwright .72
3. The Second Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced the question
of habeas review after state denial of a petitioner's claim on both
substantive and procedural grounds in Phillzs v. Smih ,73 decided in
1983. Phillips was convicted in New York State Supreme Court of
murder and attempted murder. Four years later he moved to vacate
the judgment in state court, contending that the trial court had vio-
lated his fifth and sixth amendment rights when it admitted alleg-
edly-immunized testimony into evidence. The state judge denied the
motion, ruling alternatively that Phillips' claim of immunity was not
timely made and that, in any event, the error was harmless.
74
The court of appeals noted at the outset that the circuits were
68 Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
69 721 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1983).
70 State v. Farmer, No. 80-2235-CR, slip. op. at 4-5 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1981).
71 Id.
72 Farmer v. Prast, 721 F.2d at 605-06.
73 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984).
74 People v. Phillips, 97 Misc. 2d 665, 412 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
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divided as to whether Wainwright applies in such a case. It adopted
the standard of the Third and Seventh Circuits, which apply the
cause-and-prejudice test whenever the state court relied expressly on
the procedural ground.75 The court gave four reasons for preferring
this approach over the available alternatives: (1) it is more consistent
with the policies underlying Wainwriht-comity, finality, accuracy,
and trial integrity;76 (2) it is more consistent with the greater weight
of courts of appeals decisions; (3) it is more consistent with related
decisions of the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court; and (4) it is
more logical.
77
E. The Four Approaches
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have chosen to apply
the Wainwright cause-and-prejudice test only when the state court re-
lied exclusively on the procedural ground. Thus, any holding on the
merits makes Wainwright inapplicable and results in the petitioner
being automatically entitled to federal habeas review.
The Sixth Circuit applies Wainwright if the procedural default
was a "substantial basis" of the state court's denial of petitioner's
claim. Under this view, the fact that the state court addressed the
merits is not necessarily determinative.
The Eighth Circuit uses a technical approach. In its sole deci-
sion in this area, the Eighth Circuit brought its analysis under the
Wainwright rule by dismissing as dictum a holding on the merits
which was preceded by a procedural holding. This in itself does not
reveal a great deal about the Eighth Circuit's position. A logical ex-
trapolation from this holding is that the decisional ground which ap-
pears first in the state court opinion is determinative and that which
follows is dictum. Therefore, if the state court addresses the proce-
dural ground first, Wainwright applies. If, on the other hand, the
court addresses the merits of the claim first, the petitioner may have
habeas review in the federal courts without meeting the Wainwrzght
requirements.
The Third, Seventh, and Second Circuits require a petitioner to
meet the cause-and-prejudice test whenever the state court relied ex-
pressly on the procedural ground, regardless of whether the state
court considered the merits of the claim. The rationale behind this is
that "an alternative disposition on the merits does not undermine the
75 Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d at 48.
76 See text accompanying notes 94-110 infa.
77 717 F.2d at 49; see text accompanying note 63 supra.
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validity, adequacy or independence of the procedural ground. ' 78
The standards used by the courts of appeals vary widely and
are, to some degree at least, incompatible. The federal courts need a
workable, uniform standard. The logical place to begin a quest for
such a standard is Wainwrzght v. Sykes.
III. Analysis of Wainwrzght v. Sykes
Fay v. No a 79 represents the outer limit to which the Supreme
Court has gone, to date, in affording state prisoners access to federal
habeas review. The Court, in Fay, held that a state prisoner has a
right to federal habeas review of his federal constitutional claim un-
less he deliberately by-passed presentation of that claim at the state
level.80 Justice Harlan, in his lengthy dissent in Fay, suggested that
the "effect [of the decision] on state procedural rules may be disas-
terous."' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Wainwr'ght,
emphasized the same concerns that Harlan had expressed. 82 While
78 Id.
79 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
80 Id. at 438-39.
81 Id. at 471 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89. The Supreme Court decided another case in-
volving the scope of federal habeas corpus relief to state prisoners in the same year in which it
decidedFay. In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Court held that a federal court to
which a state prisoner applies for writ of habeas corpus may receive evidence and try the facts
anew if the petitioner alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief. Townsend
required the federal court to grant an evidentiary hearing if newly-discovered evidence arises
or if the state trier of fact did not afford the petitioner a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 312-
18. The Warren Court intended that Townsend, like Fay, would protect prisoners' rights to
federal habeas review. Also like Fay, Townsend contained a strong dissent, this time by Justice
Stewart. One writer has observed:
The history of federal habeas corpus since 1963 has demonstrated that Town-
send and Fay have not withstood the test of time and that the Justices who dissented
in those cases perceived correctly the abuses which would result and the effect they
would have upon the administration ofjustice. Indeed, the decision in Wa'nw'rght V.
Sykes vindicated the position espoused by Justice Harlan in Fay and undercut the
basic premise of Townsend that state courts were not competent to dispose of and
protect the federal constitutional rights of persons tried in state courts.
Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Needfor Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036, 1037
(1982).
Wainwright itself boasts a strong dissent, in which Justice Brennan stated:
If the standard adopted today is later construed to require that the simple mistakes
of attorneys are to be treated as binding forfeitures, it would serve to subordinate
the fundamental rights contained in our constitutional charter to inadvertant de-
faults of rules promulgated by state agencies, and would essentially leave it to the
States, through the enactment of procedure and the certification of the competence
of local attorneys, to determine whether a habeas applicant will be permitted the
access to the federal forum that is guaranteed him by Congress.
433 U.S. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Wainwrght does not specifically overrule Fay, it has done so in effect
by limiting Pay to its facts.8 3 The cause-and-prejudice analysis of
Wainwrght has effectively replaced the "deliberate by-pass" standard
of Fay.
Wainwright held that a state prisoner whose constitutional claim
was denied by the state court for failure to comply with a contempo-
raneous objection rule is barred from federal habeas review absent a
showing of cause for noncompliance and prejudice resulting from the
violation.84 Wazzwright is a decision grounded in fundamental con-
cerns of comity, finality, and trial integrity in a bi-level judicial sys-
tem. 85 In Engle v. Isaac,8 6 the Court reviewed Wainwright's rationale,
with particular attention to the concepts of comity and finality. It
then reaffirmed that the Wainwright test applies to any procedural
default, not just defaults under contemporaneous objection rules.
87
The relevant inquiry, then, is whether Wainwright instructs the
federal courts on whether to apply the cause-and-prejudice test when
the state court has denied petitioner's claim on both substantive and
procedural grounds. Unfortunately, Wainwright itself fails to give a
direct answer to the question. The Supreme Court, in deciding Wain-
wrzght, does not appear to have envisioned such a scenario. Only one
portion of the opinion seems to touch upon this possibility:
[I]t has been the rule that the federal habeas petitioner who
claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court
in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have
the federal habeas court make its own independent determina-
tion of his federal claim, without being bound by the determina-
tion on the merits of that claim reached in the state proceedings.
This rule . . . is in no way changed by our holding today.
Rather, we deal only with contentions of federal law which were not re-
solved on the merits in the state proceedings due to respondent's failure to
raise them there as required by state procedure.88
While the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits did not rely upon
this language in limiting Wainwright to cases in which the state court
relied exclusively on the procedural grounds, they could perhaps
have done so. Wainwright itself addressed a limited factual situation.
However, it does not necessarily follow that the Court intended that
83 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88 & n.12.
84 Id. at 87.
85 See text accompanying notes 94-110 infra.
86 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
87 Id. at 129.
88 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
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its rule should not be extended to different, appropriate factual situa-
tions as they arise. If the Wainwright rule is applied to a case in
which the state court did reach the merits of the petitioner's claim,
the petitioner is still not bound by the determination on the merits of
that claim reached in the state proceedings. Rather, the petitioner is
bound by the determination on the procedural ground reached in the
state proceedings.
The only case which has commented on this portion of the Wain-
wrzht opinion is United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsy .9 In Caruso the
Third Circuit chose to apply the Wainwrz'ht test in spite of the pres-
ence of an alternate holding on the merits. The Caruso court ac-
knowledged that Wainwright contains language supporting the
petitioner's view, although Caruso did not rely on it.9° The court
then quoted two portions of the Wainwrzght opinion. In the first, the
Wainwright Court identified the area of controversy before it as "the
reviewability of federal claims which the state court has declined to
pass on because not presented in the manner prescribed by its proce-
dural rules." 9' The second quotation from Wainwright was: "[W]e
deal only with contentions of federal law which were not resolved on
the merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to raise
them there as required by state procedure. '92 The Caruso court then
stated:
The quoted language could certainly be interpreted as restricting
the procedural default rule to those cases in which the procedural
bar resulted in the state court not indicating its view of the merits
of the constitutional claim. On the other hand, the Wainwrzght
Court's attention was not focused on the issue before this court
now, and we must be circumspect in attributing decisive weight
to language employed in a significantly different factual
context.
93
When looking to Wainwright for guidance on whether to grant
federal habeas review, what ought to be attributed decisive weight?
The obvious answer is the policy objectives which the Supreme
Court focused on and set out in Wainwrzght. From these basic policy
objectives, a rule emerges which lower federal courts can apply when
faced with a question of habeas review of a state's alternate substan-
tive and procedural denials of a petitioner's claim.
89 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982).
90 Id. at 440.
91 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82 (emphasis omitted).
92 Id. at 87.
93 United States cx rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 440.
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The Wainwright Court gave four reasons for adopting the cause-
and-prejudice test over the Fay deliberate by-pass standard.94 First,
state procedural rules deserve greater respect than the Fay standard
gave them. Second, honoring state procedural rules contributes to
finality in criminal litigation. Third, if the federal habeas courts re-
fuse to honor state rules of procedure, the state courts themselves
may become less stringent in enforcing them. Finally, the failure of
the habeas courts to honor state procedural rules detracts from the
perception of the criminal trial as a "decisive and portentous
event." 95 These reasons were given within the factual context of
Wainwright-that is, where the state appellate court had denied the
petitioner's claim on a procedural ground only. However, they apply
with equal force where the state court denied petitioner's claim on
both substantive and procedural grounds.
The first reason the Wainwright Court gave in support of its
cause-and-prejudice test was that the state's contemporaneous objec-
tion rule "is by no means peculiar to Florida, and deserves greater
respect than Fay gives it, both for the fact that it is employed by a
coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system and for the many
interests which it serves in its own right. ' 96 The Court was con-
cerned with comity.
One writer has defined comity as "the recognition that the
courts of coordinate systems can and must exercise forbearance in
cases in which both are interested, lest they interfere with each other,
create confusion and distrust, and sacrifice the utility that comes
with cooperation. ' 97 In the context of habeas review, comity means
that the federal courts should respect and abide by state court deter-
minations. The Wainwright Court found this concern highly persua-
sive in its decision to require a showing of cause and prejudice before
the federal habeas courts will review state court denials based on pro-
cedural defaults.
The argument loses none of its force merely by virtue of the fact
that an alternate holding on the merits is present. In fact, interests of
comity weigh even more strongly in favor of erecting the cause-and-
prejudice barrier in such a case: the state has provided two alterna-
tive grounds for its denial of petitioner's claim, instead of just one, as
in a case like Wainwright. In Wainwright, the Supreme Court adopted
94 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-90.
95 Id. at 90.
96 Id. at 88.
97 Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First
Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 394 (1983).
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the cause-and-prejudice test in order to avoid stepping on a state
court's toes.9s Courts which decline to apply the Wainwr'ght test
where the state court relied alternatively on procedural and substan-
tive grounds-as the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
done9 9 -are stepping on twice as many toes, or perhaps stepping on
the same number, but with a heavier boot.
Considering the problem from the perspective of the state judge
adds momentum to this argument. In Phillips v. Smith, 00 the Second
Circuit refused to declare the Wainwright test inapplicable where the
state judge had provided an alternate holding on the merits. "We
will not penalize the state court for addressing the merits in the alter-
native, particularly when it may have done so in order to provide an
alternative basis for affirmance in the event the procedural ruling is
reversed."101 If adding a substantive holding to an independent and
adequate procedural ground results in the claim becoming fair game
for the federal courts on collateral review, state courts will surely
hesitate to address the merits at all. 102
The adoption of the cause-and-prejudice test in Wainwrzht was
motivated largely by these considerations of comity. Comity consid-
erations weigh even more heavily in favor of applying the Wainwright
test where the state court has provided an alternate holding on the
merits.
The second reason the Wainwrzght Court gave for adopting the
cause-and-prejudice standard was that insulating state court deci-
sions based on procedural defaults under contemporaneous objection
98 Of course, the Court was concerned about more than just incurring the wrath of state
judges. As Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982),
stated: "Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the State's sovereign power
to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Id. at 128.
In a footnote to this statement, she observed:
In an individual case, the significance of this frustration may pale beside the
need to remedy a constitutional violation. Over the long term, however, federal
intrusions may seriously undermine the morale of our state judges. As one scholar
has observed, there is "nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility,
of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult
and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that
all the shots will always be called by someone else." . . . Indiscriminate federal
intrusions may simply diminish the fervor of state judges to root out constitutional
errors on their own.
Id. at 128-29 n.33 (quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 451 (1963))(citation omitted).
99 See text accompanying notes 33-50 supra.
100 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984).
101 Id. at 49.
102 See id. at 51.
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rules would make "a major contribution to finality in criminal litiga-
tion."' 10 3 The concern over finality in litigation is substantial in
habeas corpus actions.10 4 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,105 succinctly stated a position which would
later be embraced by a majority of the Court in Wainwright:
No effective judicial system can afford to concede the contin-
uing theoretical possibility that there is error in every trial and
that every incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law
must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been commit-
ted, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one
should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting every
imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should look for-
ward to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen. 1
0 6
State procedural rules are generally formulated with an eye to
accuracy, efficiency, and finality in trials. Clearly, the Wainwn'ght
rule promotes finality in criminal litigation where the state decision
was purely procedural in nature. It seems equally clear that the rule
would serve the same, no less important, function where the state
court has included an alternate holding on the merits. In fact, as
with comity, interests of finality weigh even more strongly in favor of
applying the cause-and-prejudice test in such cases, since granting
103 Wainwrght, 433 U.S. at 88. Closely related to the Court's concern for finality was its
concern that the Fay rule may encourage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers. A
lawyer may deliberately choose to withhold a viable constitutional claim in the state trial
court with the intent to raise it in a federal habeas court in the event the defendant is con-
victed. Since the Fay rule did not protect a "deliberate by-pass" of state procedure, it is
difficult to see why the Wainwrght Court felt that it was inadequate to prevent "sandbag-
ging." One author has noted that thePa, rule "was expected to be broad enough to deal with
calculated strategic choices to circumvent state procedures." Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 753.
In any event, however, the Court believed that the cause-and-prejudice standard of Wain-
wright would more effectively discourage sandbagging. The validity of this view is in no way
altered by the addition of a substantive holding by the state court.
104 In Engle, the Court observed:
[Writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offend-
ers. Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render
retrial difficult, even impossible. While a habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the
defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete free-
dom from prosecution.
456 U.S. at 127-28.
105 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
106 Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring)(footnote omitted). Judge Friendly and Professor
Bator have suggested that this absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation.
Deterrence depends upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and cer-
tainly become subject to punishment, just punishment." Bator, supra note 98, at 452. Reha-
bilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to sanction,
that he stands in need of rehabilitation." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 146 (1970).
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federal habeas review undermines the finality of two state court hold-
ings, instead of just one. Thus, the second Wainwriht rationale, fi-
nality, supports extension of the cause-and-prejudice standard to a
case involving a state denial alternatively based on substantive and
procedural grounds.
The third and fourth policy reasons given in Wainwright were
that the federal habeas courts' refusal to honor state procedural rules
may cause the state courts themselves to become less stringent in
their enforcement, and may detract from the perception of the crimi-
nal trial as a "decisive and portentous event." 10 7 These two reasons
really address a single concern which the Second Circuit character-
ized, in Philhs v. Smith, as the promotion of trial integrity. 108
The Philips court endorsed the view that "by giving effect to
state procedural rules designed to preserve the trial as 'a decisive and
portentous event,' the procedural default standard help[s] to ensure
the integrity of the trial and the accuracy of the verdict." 10 9 If this is
true where the state court declined to review the merits due to a pro-
cedural defect, it is no less true where the state court denied the claim
on the merits in spite of the procedural defect. Once again, the addi-
tion of a substantive holding actually strengthens the argument for
imposing the cause-and-prejudice test. The federal courts ought not
to penalize state courts for explaining (through merit holdings) why
the petitioner does not suffer by denial of his claim. 110
Thus, the three interests which prompted the Supreme Court to
adopt the Wainwright test-comity, finality, and trial integrity-
would be best served by applying that test where the state court's
decision contains an alternate substantive holding. This approach
comports with the current Supreme Court policy of conservativism in
granting federal habeas review. Additionally, where the procedural
ground in and of itself is sufficient to determine the outcome of the
case, it is difficult to see the efficacy of giving the petitioner a wind-
fall-automatic federal habeas review-merely because the state
court chose to include an alternate ground for denial.
The message Wainwright presents is this: A state prisoner whose
claim was denied at the state level due to a procedural default must
demonstrate cause and prejudice in order to obtain federal habeas
review. Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit once wrote that,
107 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90.
108 Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d at 48.
109 Id. at 48 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90).
110 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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"when a lower court perceives a pronounced new doctrinal trend in
Supreme Court decisions, it is its duty, cautiously to be sure, to fol-
low not to resist it." ''  In a footnote to this statement, Judge Frank
added: "To use mouth-filling words, cautious extrapolation is in
order."
12
"Cautious extrapolation" of the sort recommended by Judge
Frank leads to the conclusion that the Wainwrght test ought to apply
in the event of a state denial on procedural grounds, notwithstanding
the presence of an alternate holding on the merits. The Third, Sev-
enth, and Second Circuits engaged in cautious extrapolation and
concluded, as stated by the Second Circuit, that "an alternative dis-
position on the merits does not undermine the validity, adequacy or
independence of the procedural ground."
e 3
The Sixth Circuit's "substantial basis" test" 4 seems well-
founded, but may not go quite far enough in protecting independent
and adequate state procedural grounds. It is conceivable that a state
court decision the substantial basis of which is a holding on the mer-
its might also contain a valid independent and adequate state proce-
dural ground. Under the Sixth Circuit's approach, the procedural
ground will be given less weight than ought to be given an independ-
ent and adequate state ground, and the petitioner will get automatic
habeas review in the federal courts.
The view which the Eighth Circuit took in Dietz v. Solem,115
athough not yet fully developed, appears to be arbitrary. If devel-
oped as logic would suggest, it would further Wainwrzghl's objectives
in some, but not all, cases. The approach of the Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, 1 6 limiting Wainwight to purely procedural hold-
ings by the state court, clearly frustrates the policy objectives of the
Supreme Court.' 1
7
1l1 Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1942), a'd, 317 U.S. 501
(1943).
112 Id. at 501 n.30.
113 Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d at 49; see text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
114 See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
115 640 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1981); see text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
116 See text accompanying notes 33-50 supra.
117 See text accompanying notes 94-1 iOsupra. Professor Walter Murphy has examined the
ways in which state and lower federal courts modify or resist Supreme Court pronounce-
ments. See Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. ScI. Rav. 1017
(1959). "The Supreme Court typically formulates general policy. Lower courts apply that
policy, and working in its interstices, inferior [court] judges may materially modify the High
Court's determinations." Id. at 1018.
One example of such lower court resistance is the reaction of the lower federal courts to
the Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). Professor James
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IV. Suggested Approach
The decisions of the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
Robertson, in a recent law review article, has thoroughly discussed the lower federal courts'
resistance to the Rhodes decision. Robertson, When the Supreme Court Commands, Do the Lower
Federal Courts Obey? The Impact of Rhodes v. Chapman on Correctional Litigation, 7 HAMLINE L.
REV. 79 (1984). Rhodes held that double-ceiling of prisoners per se and as practiced at the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility was not cruel and unusual punishment within the mean-
ing of the eighth amendment. According to Professor Robertson:
Read against the backdrop of the majority's dicta urging deference to the actions of
prison administrators, the Court's restrictive application of the eighth amendment
to prison conditions presented a clear message to the federal judiciary: Federal
courts should exercise considerable caution before interjecting themselves into the
operation of state prisons.
Robertson, supra, at 80. Professor Robertson examines the post-Rhodes decisions of the lower
federal courts, concluding that "both the will and the constitutional basis for judicial inter-
vention in overcrowded state prisons find continuing expression among the district courts."
Robertson, supra, at 98.
Wainwright presents a similar picture. Read against the backdrop of the majority's dicta
urging deference to the decisions of state courts, Wainwright's restriction of state prisoners'
access to federal habeas review likewise presented the federal judiciary with a clear message:
Federal courts should avoid reviewing state court decisions which are grounded in an in-
dependent and adequate state procedural ground. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
like the district courts in the Rhodes situation, are not following that message. The Eighth
Circuit's stance is unclear at this point, but it seems too arbitrary to be in harmony with the
Supreme Court's directive in Wainwrzght.
According to Professor Murphy, there are three principle ways in which lower courts
modify or resist Supreme Court determinations. First, the lower court may refuse to extend a
Supreme Court decision to other areas, by limiting it to its facts. Second, the lower court may
base its decision on what it perceives the Supreme Court would do if presented with the case
at hand, a "kind of speculation [which] comes close to giving oneself a blank check." Mur-
phy, supra, at 80. Third, the lower court may focus on a particular facet of the Supreme
Court decision, thus in effect reinterpreting it.
Professor Robertson contends that "Rhodes' restrictive eighth amendment analysis has
been negated by lower federal courts distinguishing Rhodes on the facts." Robertson, supra, at
97. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits may also be distinguishing Wainwright on its
facts. The Fifth Circuit gave no supporting rationale for its decision in Thompson v. Estelle,
642 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1981). In Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 740 (1983), the Eleventh Circuit seems to have accepted the precedent of the
Fifth Circuit, see note 41 supra, without any concern for its rationale. The Ninth Circuit, in
Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), "assumed" that the state's failure to rest
exclusively on the procedural default permitted it to reach the federal question. 594 F.2d at
1296 n.2. These cases appear to distinguish Wainwright on its facts, contending that the addi-
tion of the alternate merit holding makes the Wainwright standard inappropriate. This, how-
ever, is a distinction without a difference.
Professor Robertson suggests that three attributes of a Supreme Court decision foster
significant compliance: (1) the clarity of the ruling; (2) the unanimity of the Justices; and (3)
the Court's periodic reiteration of the announced policy. Robertson, supra, at 99. See generally
S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES
(1970); R. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE (1967); Barth, Perception and Acceptance
of Supreme Court Decisions at the State and Local Level, 17 J. PUB. L. 308, 314 (1968). Under this
analysis, the lower courts ought to comply with Wainwright: its message is clear, six Justices
joined in the majority opinion, and the Court reiterated the policies behind Wainwrght in its
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are in keeping with the objectives of the Supreme Court. These ap-
proaches vary somewhat: the Sixth Circuit applies the Wainwright
test whenever the procedural ground is a "substantial basis" of the
state court's denial of petitioner's claim, while the Third, Seventh,
and Second Circuits apply Wainwright whenever the state court re-
lied expressly on the procedural ground. The courts should adopt a
consistent standard which works toward the policy objectives which
the Supreme Court elucidated in Wainwright.
The federal courts should require a petitioner whose federal
claim was denied by the state court on the basis of both substantive
and procedural grounds to meet the Wainwright cause-and-prejudice
test ifthe procedural ground was dispositive of the claim. Under this stan-
dard, the federal courts would give the proper respect to state proce-
dural holdings which are independent and adequate state grounds.
At the same time, no state prisoner would be deprived of federal
habeas review on the basis of a procedural holding which is inade-
quate to support the denial of his claim.
In order to facilitate fair and consistent application of this stan-
dard, the federal courts should adopt a rule like that which the
Supreme Court established in Michigan v. Long.I18 Under the "plain
statement" rule of Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court will decline
decision in Engle. Additionally, Wainwright itself should have presented no surprises in terms
of policy, since it came on the heels of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Another possible explanation for lower court resistance to a Supreme Court directive is a
hostile social and political environment surrounding the ruling. In this respect, Wainwright is
much like Rhodes:
Rhodes is free of social and political contention. One cannot detect a hostile social
and political environment surrounding the ruling; indeed, the Court held against an
insular, powerless minority-inmates who command little public sympathy. Ac-
cordingly, the social and political environment of Rhodes should be supportive of
compliance. The limited impact of Rhodes on the lower federal courts cannot, there-
fore, be attributed to controversy and resistance by influential groups.
Robertson, supra, at 99. Wainwright, like Rhodes, does not appear to have been a controversial
decision. Robertson suggests that in such a case, one must look to "the attributes of the
decision and the predilections of lower federal court judges." Id.
118 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). In Michigan v. Long, the Court considered whether it had juris-
diction to review a state court decision which "referred twice to the state constitution.
but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law." Id. at 3474. The Court stated:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the
opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court de-
cided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 3476. But, "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alterna-
tively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will
not undertake to review the decision." Id.
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to review directly a state court decision that rests on independent and
adequate state grounds. Only those state court decisions which con-
tain plain statements that they rest upon independent and adequate
state grounds are immune from direct review by the Supreme Court.
This rule could be adapted for use in collateral review. If a state
court wishes the federal courts to recognize its alternate procedural
holding in their decision of whether to afford habeas review to the
state prisoner, it must include in its opinion a plain statement that
the procedural ground is dispositive of the claim. Such a statement
would trigger the application of the Wazwrzght test.
V. Conclusion
In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Supreme Court held that a state pris-
oner whose claim was denied on the state level due to a procedural
default must show cause for his noncompliance and actual prejudice
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation in order to obtain
federal habeas review. This cause-and-prejudice standard was in-
tended to serve the Court's interests in comity, finality, and trial
integrity.
Wainwrzght itself did not indicate whether the same standard
ought to attach where the state court based its denial of petitioner's
claim on the merits, as well as a procedural default. The circuits are
split on this question. However, careful analysis of the Wainwright
decision shows that the federal courts must apply the cause-and-
prejudice standard in such situations if they wish to further the
Supreme Court's policy objectives.
The federal courts need a uniform standard by which to deter-
mine whether to apply the Wainwnght test. The cause-and-prejudice
test ought to apply where the procedural ground relied upon by the
state court is dispositive of the petitioner's claim. Additionally, the
federal courts ought to impose a "plain statement" rule like that of
Miczhigan v. Long. A state court wishing to insulate its procedural
holdings from federal habeas corpus review must include in its opin-
ion a plain statement that the procedural ground is dispositive of the
case. Where such a plain statement exists, the federal courts will not
undertake habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice.
This approach would not be burdensome for the state courts
and would greatly ease the interpretive burden of the federal courts.
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Most importantly, it would ensure that the federal courts give the
decisions of state courts the respect and weight they deserve.
Marian J. Kent
